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Abstract
Taking a longitudinal case study approach, this article examines the process of rule breaking in 
a newly formed UK domiciliary care provider. In this study, the founder acted in such a manner 
so as to partially decouple the organization from externally imposed institutional rules and 
regulations, allowing the emergence of informal rules between carer and client. These informal 
rules increasingly guided the behaviours of care workers over time, resulting in the breach of 
formal strictures. Building on the dimensions of hierarchy and contentiousness, rule breaking is 
conceptualized here as a phenomenon which occurs as a result of the tension between competing 
formal and informal rules, at multiple levels throughout the organizational hierarchy.
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Introduction
In the New Public Management of health and social care provision in the UK, a combina-
tion of regulation and market competition have been put forward as the solution to longer-
term cost efficiencies and competitiveness. However, these solutions place the state in an 
ambiguous position (Ferner and Colling, 1995). On the one hand, it has a stake in ensuring 
privatized services have popular legitimacy. This is particularly the case in social care, 
given the sector’s growth, and regular public scandals around abuses. On the other hand, 
too close a monitoring of service quality may undermine the intended appearance of 
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competitive market-based integrity of the privatization process. This balancing act is also 
played out at many levels, as organizations, managers and frontline workers act to recon-
cile the often competing demands for competition and regulation. It is within this context 
that different manifestations of rule breaking can occur.
When studying service providers, exploring the complex interrelationships between 
organization, employee and service users becomes particularly important (Lopez, 2010), 
and some have extended this multi-layered approach in the study of rule breaking 
(Bensman and Gerver, 1963; Gouldner, 1964) in organizations. Recently, Martin et al. 
(2013: 559) defined rule breaking ‘as an organizational phenomenon captured by two core 
dimensions: the level of social action (individual, group, or organization) and the inten-
sity of rule enforcement’. First, rule breaking has hierarchical dimensions – individuals 
or groups at the frontline may break rules on their own accord, or it may be initiated by 
managers; the latter may range from the pursuit of organizational goals, to outright white 
collar crime (Martin et al., 2013). Lower-level rule breaking may be abetted by manage-
ment, allowing them to absolve themselves of responsibility in the event of exposure. 
Second, as Martin et al. (2013) note, rule breaking may be permitted or opposed by 
management, and varies in the extent of contentiousness and how intensely rules are 
enforced. Rule breaking thus exists on a continuum between contested and permitted. 
Furthermore, rule breaking may be a social phenomenon, coordinated by work groups or 
an individual act (Martin et al., 2013), the core focus of this article. While Martin et al.’s 
(2013: 559) account focuses on departure from formal rules, they do not consider viola-
tions from informal norms of expected behaviour, nor the creation of new informally 
constituted rules. Rather, they point towards ‘understanding the interplay between rule 
breaking and informal norms as a critical next [research] step’ (Martin et al., 2013: 571). 
Addressing this call, in this study the role played by emerging informal rules on formal 
rule-breaking behaviours is investigated. Taking a longitudinal case study approach, the 
growth of a small UK domiciliary care provider was tracked from start-up to its tripling 
in size in just 12 months. Domiciliary or home care involves the provision of social care 
services to adults in their homes. As with many organizations operating in this area, the 
firm was not unionized; hence, workers lacked access to a key channel for voicing any 
concerns.
This article makes two key contributions to literature in this area. First, drawing on 
Martin et al. (2013), rule breaking along the dimensions of hierarchy and contention is 
examined. Rule-breaking behaviours are reinterpreted within the context of a multi-lay-
ered system of legitimization, as the founder acted to decouple external and internal 
processes of legitimization. By adopting institutional rules and regulations at start-up, 
the founder first sought to achieve external legitimacy within the marketplace. At the 
same time, she differentiated the company’s service offering from the competition by 
emphasizing continuity of care and the development of client-focused relationships. 
Second, the founder sanctioned rule-breaking behaviours among care workers, when it 
was perceived that such behaviours were (a) in the best interests of clients and (b) when 
formal rules were seen to hinder the delivery of this client-focused service offering. 
However, in the absence of formal rules, and as relationships developed between carer 
and client, informal social rules emerged, which increasingly guided interactions and, 
with this, formal rule-breaking behaviours. The emergence of these informal rules was 
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driven by values of social care and justice held by the care workers. It is argued here that, 
given the ambiguous, idiosyncratic and informal nature of care provision, as represented 
by the carer–client relationship, externally imposed formal prescriptive rules are per-
ceived as inadequate and treated as such. In other words, rule-breaking behaviours sanc-
tioned by the founder allowed the organization to pursue a competitive market position, 
while maintaining the outward appearance of legitimization. Therefore, this article seeks 
to add to Martin et al.’s (2013) conceptualization of rule breaking by highlighting the 
role played by informal rules alongside formal rule breaking. Thus, rule breaking is con-
ceptualized here as a phenomenon which occurs as a result of the tension between com-
peting formal and informal rules, at multiple levels throughout the organizational 
hierarchy. When competing rules are incompatible, following emergent informal norms 
may result in formal strictures being broken. This struggle is played out across levels, 
through the behaviours of individuals, groups and organizations. Contentiousness in this 
sense refers to differing interpretations of, and power struggles around, competing sets 
of formal and informal rules.
The article thus explores the process through which the rule-breaking process is 
engendered and persists through interactions between employees, owner and client and 
through overlapping agendas: effective client-centred service delivery, organizational 
performance and duties of care. The study unpacks the multi-layered nature of rule-
breaking behaviours, including the manner in which such transgressions on the part of 
care workers are justified – and, at times, even imparted with a degree of moral purpose 
– and the ambivalent role of management as agents of both formality and misconduct.
Rule breaking and the care sector
The relevance of rule-breaking behaviours is particularly salient in the care sector, with 
public sector reforms resulting in the promotion of predetermined standards and associ-
ated rules (Dibben and James, 2007; Le Gales and Scott, 2010). In the case of care provi-
sion there are two strands of externally imposed regulation. The first, more ideologically 
motivated, seeks to promote and manage the market for social care. In the UK, the 
Community Care Act (1996) was put in place to give power of choice to clients, by putting 
finances in their hands and giving them the choice to directly employ carers (Morris, 
1997; Ungerson, 1999). While the rhetoric of ‘consumer choice’ has attained dominance 
within New Public Management (Dibben and James, 2007), this has often been coupled 
with increasing regulations aimed at micro-managing such a process, either to promote an 
ideological agenda and/or to favour certain commercial players within a sector. The sec-
ond strand of regulation, more directly orientated towards immediate patient well-being, 
seeks to uphold the quality of care provision, although, in reality, these two agendas may 
overlap. The Care Quality Commission (CQC) is an independent regulator of all health 
and social care services in England with legal powers. All care providers must register 
with the CQC, which sets rules and operating procedures and inspects all domiciliary care 
providers at least once per year, including interviews with clients and staff, checks on 
formal systems and procedures, and assessments of standards of quality and safety. 
Guidelines set out by the CQC, however, allow some room for manoeuvre for organiza-
tions, with regards to the specific practices adopted in, say, recording medication, 
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providing these practices address key quality measures. In addition to such regulatory and 
institutionally linked rules, many companies also adopt organization-specific rules (e.g. 
wearing uniforms).
What sets these regulated sectors apart is that many of the standards and rules are 
imposed from outside the organization (often ultimately devised by external consultants; 
Le Gales and Scott, 2010), which means that aspects of them may lack legitimacy in the 
eyes of managers and workers alike and be poorly aligned to the realities of day-to-day 
practice (Mascini, 2005). Given the complexity of care, and the unpredictability of some 
older adults, the rigid adherence to standardized guidelines is at times not in the interests 
of the latter, and can conflict with the personal values of the care worker (Carlsson-Wall 
et al., 2011). As a result, the breaking of generalized hard and fast rules is a key element 
in the provision of care (Bolton and Wibberley, 2014; Burns et al., 2013; Carlsson-Wall 
et al., 2011), with care companies and clients regularly relying on the discretionary effort 
of carers who do things beyond the care plan (Bolton and Wibberley, 2014). Changing 
economic pressures in the care industry have further resulted in an increasing focus on 
cost efficiencies, and pressures to standardization (Carlsson-Wall et al., 2011). Yet, to 
cope with the complexities of the job, care workers often have to decide what care to 
deliver, resulting in tasks being completed outside the care plan, or not following guide-
lines when they conflict with the carer’s understanding of the client’s needs (Bolton and 
Wibberley, 2014). As the industrial relations literature alerts us (Hyman, 1975), smooth 
production may depend on everyday low-key rule breaking of unnecessary or minor 
strictures, making ‘work to rule’ such an effective union tactic (Kleiner et al., 2002).
A central concern of the literature on the moral economy of the workplace is the inter-
twined nature of the economy and society; ultimately, the latter is reliant on the persis-
tence of a social and moral sphere. It further highlights the extent to which the employment 
relationship is not simply a transactional one, but encompasses a range of moral and 
social relations (Bolton and Laaser, 2013: 517), including the empathy and moral agency 
components of work and employment. It is within this context that rule breaking needs 
to be viewed. Individuals engage in particular types of behaviour in response to the dif-
ferent ties and pressures that may pull them in different directions: towards the organiza-
tional agenda, their ties with peers and their perceived duties to clients and other 
stakeholders. Organizations might further adopt rules ceremonially, by decoupling exter-
nal strictures and internal operations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Seeking internal flexi-
bility to dilute external systemically imposed rigidity thus rests at the heart of rule-breaking 
activity (Hodson et al., 2012; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
In this sense the emergence of informal rules, which act to challenge externally 
imposed strictures, give individuals the opportunity to innovate and manage this flexibil-
ity (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979). What Burawoy (1979) calls ‘mak-
ing out’ is a game played at the group level, with its own set of informal norms and rules, 
which compete and at times triumph over formal organizational rules. By adhering to 
formal rules, ‘management is being accused of “cheating”, of not playing according to 
the rules of the game; and these accusations serve to reassert the legitimacy of the rules 
and the values of making out’ (Burawoy, 1979: 83).
The autonomy achieved through this process of self-organization reflects a need for 
local rules to meet the interests of those concerned, including values of social justice 
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(Baines, 2011; Bolton and Laaser, 2013). For example, Blau (1964) found that frontline 
receptionists at an unemployment agency broke rules when they saw such actions as 
helpful to jobseekers. Similarly, Hutchinson (1990: 4) found that nurses broke ‘illegiti-
mate’ rules, arguing that ‘a principled level nurse … questions rules that do not serve 
human values’. Again, as Bensman and Rosenberg (1963) argue, employees break rules 
in order to accommodate client or subordinate needs, and as a result either empower 
themselves or better identify themselves with the client. Although often depicted in neg-
ative terms, such rule breaking may fulfil a social function and contribute to organiza-
tional and/or stakeholder well-being (Morrison, 2006).
However, management themselves also have a role to play in such rule-breaking 
behaviours, as they attempt to balance conflicting goals at different levels. Indeed, ‘for-
bidden’ behaviour may be sanctioned and supported by frontline managers (Bensman 
and Gerver, 1963). Hence, a key distinction is between managerially encouraged rule 
breaking to get the job done and employee motivated rule breaking to impart work with 
meaning, challenge managerial authority and/or uphold notions of duty or professional-
ism; as noted above, rule breaking varies according to contentiousness and underlying 
rationale (Martin et al., 2013). It also makes it harder for employers to crack down on 
rule breaking that goes beyond what is managerially sanctioned: workers may respond 
by keeping to all rules, undermining the capability to get the job done. As with the pre-
cise amount of labour power provided, the commitment to adhere to managerial rules 
that form an inherent part of the employment contract is never something that can be 
fully enforced or even clearly delineated (cf. Hyman, 1975).
Ackroyd and Thompson define misbehaviour, in encompassing a wide range of activ-
ities from pilfering to adjusting production rates, as ‘deviation from expected standards 
of conduct’ (1999: 3). As Taska (2012) notes, rule breaking also may involve the making 
of new informally constituted rules. This is importantly different from ‘misbehaviour’ in 
that it is not just about engaging in conduct that contests ‘matters related to work, product 
and identity’ (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 25), but also delineating, albeit informal 
strictures, as to what constitutes acceptable behaviour. Rule breaking may not only 
encompass the type of creativity and informality that characterizes misbehaviour, but 
also attempts at legitimization (Martin et al., 2013). Finally, unlike a significant compo-
nent of rule breaking, outright misbehaviour is generally not something encouraged by 
management.
Research method
This study seeks to explore the process through which rules are broken over time, and 
indeed in the first instance. By examining these behaviours at multiple levels of analysis 
(Carlsson-Wall et al., 2011), light is shed on the process through which individuals and 
groups deviate from rules imposed at an institutional and organizational level. To address 
this objective, a longitudinal case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) was taken, in which 
the growth of a firm operating in the UK domiciliary care sector was tracked from start-
up to tripling in size in just 12 months. While studies of the care sector have been carried 
out before (Essen, 2008; Eustis and Fischer, 1991; Ungerson, 1999), this study focuses 
on the emergence and development of practices over a period of time following the 
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business start-up. In addition, past studies have largely focused on the views of clients, 
with little research examining care from the perspective of the care worker, or the man-
agement of those care workers within a growing small business context (Eustis and 
Fischer, 1991; Ungerson, 1999). It is argued that this perspective is needed given the 
nature of rule-breaking behaviours. As a result, the case chosen captures the emerging 
practices through interaction between carers, client and owner-manager. The study was 
therefore carried out in two stages:
Stage I: In this stage the behaviour of the start-up group of employees working at the 
organization between August and December 2010 was studied. In-depth interviews 
(between 1 and 1.5 hours) were carried out with the founder, senior carer A, and carers 
A–D (a total of 10 employees worked at the organization at that time). Interviewees 
were asked to describe their daily care activities, and how these changed over time. Both 
observations and recorded daily log entries were used to confirm descriptions of behav-
iour given (Eisenhardt, 1989). The researcher spent a period of 1 month during August/
September 2010 observing the behaviours of senior carer A, and carers A–D at the home 
of client X. The client in question had been with the organization since its founding and 
employed all carers mentioned. Copies of all daily logs were also taken during this 
period. In this manner a typical care arrangement was tracked over a period of time, 
during which the researcher spent between 1 and 2 hours, typically 4 days per week, at 
the client’s home. As shown below, these observations were used to verify interview 
responses, observe behaviours and include the client’s perspective in the research.
Stage II: In this stage the researcher spent a total of 15 days at the offices of the com-
pany, and a further period of 1 month in May/June 2011 observing the changing 
behaviours of carers A–D in the home of client X. Copies of accompanying daily log 
sheets were taken. Client X was also interviewed to explore changes in behaviours of 
the care group over the previous year. During this period a total of 30 employees were 
working for the organization, of which 17 were interviewed, including the founder, all 
four senior carers (senior carers A–D), the training manager and 11 carers (carers 
A–K). As in Stage I, interviewees where invited to describe in detail their daily prac-
tices, including the key tasks completed, interaction with clients, other carers and the 
owner-manager. In addition, they were asked about key changes which had occurred 
over their period of employment with the organization. Given the sensitive nature of 
the research carried out, agreement and consent was sought in advance with the 
founder, all participating care workers and client X (the latter being known to the 
researcher before the study). In order not to compromise the client or any of the care 
workers, observations did not include any tasks which might be considered personal 
or sensitive in nature (e.g. showering, washing).
The study focused on analysing and interpreting the anonymized narratives given by 
individuals as they described the emergence and development of care relationships over 
time. To avoid precedence being given to prior theoretical views, an attempt was made 
to represent the experience and interpretations of informants, and as such the approach 
adopted for this study can best be described as interpretivist. In order to allow key themes 
to emerge from the data, analysis was carried out concurrently at both stages of data 
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collection. In Stage I, all interviews were fully transcribed and, together with detailed 
field notes, were manually analysed and coded to identify key emergent themes. In Stage 
II, the interview format was altered slightly, with individuals being asked to elaborate on 
these themes. Again, coding and analysis was completed in parallel (using NVivo 9). 
This analysis consisted first in identifying key themes drawn directly from interview 
responses given by participants, observation field notes and daily log records (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 1994). From these concepts in use, second-order relationships were identified 
between and among these emerging themes. This involved a process of constant com-
parison in which comparisons were made between participants and observations, and 
over time in both stages of the research. In this way, a convergence in theoretical rela-
tionships was identified. These themes and relationships were further analysed and com-
pared with key concepts in the extant and enfolding literature as discussed below. A 
limitation of the research is that it did not encompass the stories of the subjects of the 
care (with the exception of client X), who, it is recognized, may have alternative under-
standings as to the operation of the rules governing the carers and the extent to which rule 
breaking really serves their interests or not.
Findings
Formal rules at start-up
At start-up the small business owner put in place a number of formal policies and proce-
dures specifically in relation to the delivery of care, many of which were required as part 
of the registration process with CQC. Table 1 summarizes these key organizational poli-
cies, regulations and rules, which include a mix of abstractly defined, managerialist 
rhetoric, more specific company rules (e.g. uniform requirements) and regulatory 
requirements (e.g. review and monitoring procedures).
Most of these formal practices, such as client assessment, planning, review and moni-
toring procedures were dealt with directly by the owner-manager, who had previously 
worked as a care manager with a large competitor. Other policies related to the delivery 
of care and were discussed in detail with all care workers and clients during induction 
and initial client visits, respectively. Printed copies were also retained at every client’s 
home. Rules and procedures relating to the delivery of care (e.g. how the care worker 
developed his/her working relationship with the client) were unclear, and focused instead 
on key ‘dos and don’ts’ (e.g. do not use the client’s bank cards to withdraw cash, do not 
take the client’s telephone number, etc.) (see Table 1). This reflects the trend noted by 
Bolton and Wibberley (2014) towards documenting only the explicit aspects of care, as 
opposed to the more ambiguous nature of emerging relationships and behaviour. Equally, 
while the founder ‘trained’ carers in how to carry out key formal practices such as com-
pleting daily log sheets, or medication sheets, she had little direct involvement in how the 
care workers delivered care to clients. Though formal control procedures were in place, 
as shown in Table 1, to monitor the quality of care provision, the founder also ‘kept an 
eye on things’ through informal communication directly with both clients and carers. In 
this way, both carers and clients could directly contact the founder whenever anything 
‘out of the ordinary’ occurred (as noted below, these ‘extraordinary’ occurrences became 
much less frequent over a period of time):
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… If there [are] any issues then she’d ring the carers and ask us if there [are] any issues as well 
… (Senior Carer A)
… If there’s a problem I’ll phone them straight away and say ‘why has this happened?’… (The 
founder)
Observations during Stage I of the research revealed all carers closely following these 
key formal procedures, with the exception of senior carer A. Senior carer A on the other 
hand regularly did not wear a uniform, changed the care rota without informing the 
office, bought medication for the client and frequently failed to complete daily log and 
medication sheets, effectively breaking organizational rules 3–5 (see Table 1). By con-
trast, other care workers recorded notes in the daily log sheet, completed medication and 
financial transaction sheets and adhered to the guidelines set out in the care plan (e.g. 
wearing the uniform). Any instances which involved tasks not specified in the care plan 
were referred back directly to the founder, either by telephone or face-to-face. In this 
way, carers tended to abrogate the responsibility for difficult decisions, including those 
which resulted in departure from the rules.
Formal rule breaking one year later
One year later, the founder was no longer involved in all new client assessments, or 
shadowing new care workers, with these tasks being increasingly completed by senior 
carers (who were now based at the company’s offices). Senior carers had also begun to 
complete biannual care reviews with clients. As noted above, following start-up the 
Table 1. Company procedures and documentation introduced following start-up.
Organization document Description
Org-1
Company mission
The organization is dedicated to providing high-quality, 
flexible, personal care services, tailored to the needs of 
individuals in their own homes.
Org-2
Key principles and objectives
Including respect for client’s choice, stability of the care 
team, involvement of the user in care planning, and 
adherence of health and safety guidelines, empowerment of 
the client, training of staff, etc.
Org-3
Care delivery procedures
Formal procedures for dealing with clients, including: formal 
assessment and planning, communication procedures, 
review and monitoring procedures, etc.
Org-4
Range of care services
Services included: such as health care tasks, domestic 
household tasks, shopping and pension collection, etc. Tasks 
excluded: such as moving heavy furniture, purchasing items 
outside the agreed care plan, use of client PIN numbers, 
DIY/repair jobs, delivery of care in the absence of the client 
and taking the client’s personal telephone number.
Org-5
Rules and regulations
Including company policy and formal regulations on issues 
such as acceptance of gifts, financial transactions, care 
worker uniform, ID and medication procedures.
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founder maintained informal lines of communication with all carers and clients, but this 
proved harder over time:
… Initially when I was small I probably spoke to all the service users each week. I had time to 
call them and say, ‘everything ok, fine?’… But that’s not going to work as I’m getting larger, 
I’m realizing that I need to have somebody that I trust to do it how I do it … (The founder)
Over the first year, the operation also became increasingly spread out over wide geo-
graphic distances. This resulted in care workers travelling further between client visits, 
and so spending less time with clients. One year later, incidents of rule breaking had also 
increased. For instance, in Stage II, both senior carer A and carer B failed to wear uni-
forms, as the founder herself noted:
… I presume that all my carers wear uniforms [but] one service user said, not always … (The 
founder)
Some of this rule breaking, such as choosing not to wear uniforms, may simply have 
constituted a departure from company procedures. The founder argued that the uniform 
was key to presenting the organization in a professional manner. Carers broke this rule 
for a number of reasons, ranging from convenience or personal finances (e.g. not having 
a clean, spare uniform), to keeping the client happy (e.g. for clients who preferred that 
the carer did not wear a uniform on social excursions). Other rule breaking, such as a 
failure to take adequate notes, or not following guidelines in the administration of medi-
cines, were clearly at odds with external CQC requirements. In Stage II, for example, 
carers B and D were less thorough in completing daily logs and finance sheets, while 
carers A–D withdrew money for client X and regularly bought additional medication:
… I think as a whole some carers don’t document as much as they should with medication … I 
think sometimes people are too lax with medication … (Carer C)
In Stage II, all carers also changed care rotas without informing the office by contact-
ing the client directly:
… I would ring [the client] straight away rather than bother the person who is on-call in the 
office … (Carer I)
Carers also completed tasks outside the care plan, delivered services when the client 
was not at home and regularly accepted gifts from clients. This is reflected in the follow-
ing daily log entries:
‘… collected parcel for X …’ (Carer A)
‘… popped to Boots for codeine …’ (Carer D)
‘… posted a letter …’ (Carer A)
‘X out, instructions to let myself in …’ (Carer B)
‘Let myself in, X not at home …’ (Carer A)
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So what became evident is that with growth also came more rule breaking, and that 
increasingly it was not formally managerially sanctioned. At the same time, the founder 
made it clear that flexibility, being caring and able to respond to client needs on a per-
sonal basis had enabled the organization to gain advantages over its competitors: rule 
breaking may have helped carers at times provide a better quality of care, and fulfil social 
needs, but it also served commercial ends – different objectives that became blurred.
The carer–client relationship and rule breaking
Despite the absence of formal rules and guidelines concerning the delivery of care, a 
strong degree of thematic similarity emerged in discussions with employees with regards 
to how they delivered care. The founder had attempted to differentiate the company’s 
service with the promise of consistency, and this allowed carers to develop trusting rela-
tionships with clients over time. This in turn facilitated communication, as the carers 
tailored behaviours to the specific needs of the client. Working at clients’ homes, of 
course, means that work is spatially highly fragmented, making continuous managerial 
monitoring and the uniform enforcement of rules impossible. This gives carers a great 
deal of flexibility in their interactions with clients (albeit subject to time constraints), 
allowing for the evolution of relationships that transcend the depersonalized exchanges 
characteristic of modern economic life (see Simmel, 1980), and with this the emergence 
of informal social rules guiding and shaping behaviours and interactions:
… You build that trust with them for them to be able to tell you things they wouldn’t normally 
tell anybody else … (Carer G)
… Once you get to know them then you will know … they don’t want that or they don’t want 
this … (Carer J)
… It is sort of a relationship but a working relationship. It is just talking to them and getting to 
know them … finding out things that they like … (Carer H)
In effect, alongside these developing relationships, norms and social rules emerged 
between carer and client that had greater legitimacy for both (Bensman and Gerver, 
1963; Taska, 2012). Given the degree of legitimacy of such local social rules to both par-
ties, at times these took precedence over what might be perceived as broad, rigid and 
ill-suited formal regulations. These informal norms reflect the clients’ own conceptual-
ization as to what constitutes acceptable behaviour which, in turn, gradually evolves as 
it is largely removed from the sight of managers. Many of the breaches observed stemmed 
on the one hand from the fundamental tension between emerging client-specific norms 
and ‘social rules’, which were created through developing trusting caring relationships 
with clients, and on the other hand adhering to prescriptive care plans and rules concern-
ing the delivery of care (Bolton and Wibberley, 2014; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2011). 
Moreover, the emergence of these informal rules allowed care workers to redress per-
ceived imbalances in the moral economy, becoming more aligned with their own values 
of social justice. As the company grew, lines of communication between carer and 
founder became less frequent, with care workers increasingly using their own judgement 
in deciding whether to complete additional tasks consistent with these informal rules:
 at UNIV OF ESSEX on April 26, 2016wes.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Breslin and Wood 11
… sometimes you end up doing extra than the care plan anyway because there is always little, 
other little things that they can’t do and you might do it for them … (Carer H)
… I always say that I treat my clients as I would expect a carer to treat any of my family … to 
want to do this job you have got to have a caring nature otherwise you won’t last doing it … 
(Carer G)
In this manner, formal rule breaking was justified on the grounds that it might be in 
the client’s best interest (such as withdrawing money when the client was unable to), as 
care workers used their judgement and initiative in assessing whether or not they should 
do additional tasks (not included on the care plan).
The carer–founder relationship and rule breaking
One might argue that given the small size of the organization, the founder might have acted 
to influence these rule-breaking behaviours and, as a result, the development of these 
emerging and potentially deviant ‘social rules’. As the company grew, informal communi-
cation with the founder (or ‘the office’) had become less frequent (as noted above). For 
instance, following start-up, carer A noted that she contacted the founder to gain approval 
for any request which was ‘out of the ordinary’ (including filling a hot water bottle) and 
refused to complete tasks without formal approval. One year on, she completed a number 
of tasks which were outside the formal care plan, including withdrawing money for a client 
and answering personal phone calls during care visits. However, it would be mistaken to 
assume that such rule breaking was an indication of increased ‘lawlessness’. From conver-
sations with the carers, it was noted that initially transgressions beyond the company rules 
were first checked with the founder, or the senior carers, which would seem to imply that 
the owner-manager herself allowed rules to be altered or departed from when she felt it was 
in the best interests of the client. For example, carers A–D withdrew money for client X 
following an initial informal approval being given by the founder. This exception to the 
rule was seen to be in the best interests of the client, who was unable to access the bank due 
to severe mobility issues and a lack of informal care support. In other cases, ‘trusted sen-
iors’ similarly acted on behalf of the founder to either condone activities, or in some cases 
lead by example. For example, from observations it was seen that senior carer A frequently 
broke rules concerning uniform wearing and completing log sheets immediately following 
start-up. This individual had known the founder for several years, and the latter believed 
that she would only break rules if this was in the best interests of the client:
… I’m very much like [the founder], in the respect that I care … Me and [the founder] have 
worked together for about 6 years in these bigger companies. She thought the same as me … 
(Senior Carer A)
Following her example, in Stage II of the study, all care workers within the same 
group were breaking rules to some extent:
… if they’re asking you to do something reasonable and you have got time to do it there is no 
reason why you shouldn’t … walk up to the shops or something like that, it is acceptable to do 
that … (Training Manager)
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Hence, the founder tolerated or sanctioned rule breaking when she believed it led to 
better quality care being delivered, improving client wellbeing and satisfaction with the 
care service and so increasing the competitive advantage of the organization. Care workers 
therefore interpreted the founder’s approval more broadly, and later used their own judge-
ment when being asked to perform tasks beyond formal guidelines. If management were 
prepared to sanction – and, indeed, at times authorize – formal rule breaking, then it was 
alright for them to similarly do so. Some rule breaking (e.g. uniform wearing) would be 
simply a departure from company rules. Other rule breaking, such as failure to keep logs or 
purchasing over-the-counter medicines for clients, would depart from sectoral regulatory 
guidelines. What is evident is that these two types of ‘rule breaking’ went hand in hand, and 
that one may have paved the way for the other because carers at the frontline do not always 
readily distinguish between institutional and organizational rules, and owner-sanctioned 
departures from the latter might make breaches of the former seem more acceptable. Carers 
constantly had to make judgements as to when and to what extent rules could be broken; 
both types of rule breaking may, if pushed too far, result in managerial disciplinary action.
Discussion
Drawing on Martin et al. (2013), the process of rule breaking in this study can be further 
unpacked when one considers the dimensions of hierarchy and contentiousness.
Rule breaking at the level of the organization
At start-up the founder registered the organization with the CQC, and, as a consequence, 
set in place formal rules and regulations, including both broad principles and formal 
task-specific procedures and rules. This registration gave the organization the appear-
ance of adhering to institutional rules and regulations, and as a result achieving external 
legitimacy within the care sector. At the same time, the founder decoupled local behav-
iours from these externally imposed standardized regulations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) 
by allowing frontline staff to adapt behaviours and break rules in order to make opera-
tions more effective and efficient. Therefore, right from the start, the owner personally 
saw departing from a number of external and internal rules as uncontentious, and in some 
cases, authorized them. In other words, initiating rule breaking was not simply some-
thing that came from below. First, by suggesting the transgression of specific company 
rules, the founder confirmed to carers that the needs of clients, and with this emerging 
informal ‘social rules’, might take precedence over broader and more prescriptive organ-
ization rules and regulations. Second, the founder had a key role in managing the official 
CQC inspection process (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977), making available selected clients 
and care workers for interview who would advocate and demonstrate a more formal 
adherence to institutional rules. This decoupling action allowed the organization to dif-
ferentiate its service offering and secure an advantage over competitors. As noted above, 
the founder developed a service which, in her view, addressed many of the shortcomings 
of other care companies, including continuity of care, time to develop relationships and 
putting the client’s needs first (see Table 1). Decoupling was thus seen as uncontentious 
as it allowed the organization to achieve key strategic goals.
 at UNIV OF ESSEX on April 26, 2016wes.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Breslin and Wood 13
Rule breaking at the level of the individual
When considering the care workers, three key processes underpin the increased prevalence 
of rule-breaking behaviours. First, decoupled from the constraints of more formal institu-
tional rules, care workers acted to find solutions to the often complex daily problems of the 
clients they served (Burns et al., 2013; Carlsson-Wall et al., 2011; Heaphy, 2013). Faced 
with these problems, carers interpreted the appropriateness of externally imposed standard-
ized rules and adapted behaviours to suit local conditions through everyday low-key rule 
breaking. Second, increasing workloads might have further resulted in administrative short-
cuts being taken, such as a failure to complete recording tasks (Baines, 2011). The failure to 
complete medication records might be seen to compromise client wellbeing. However, 
when visits became increasingly time-constrained, carers choose to focus on the more per-
sonal aspects of care. Third, care workers broke rules in order to continue to deliver on the 
values for care and social justice that they had signed up for when they joined the organiza-
tion (cf. Barnes, 2012), ‘gifting’ extra services to clients despite formal rules (Baines, 2011; 
Bolton and Laaser, 2013). After all, many carers left previous employers attracted by the 
value positioning of the organization in question, as one in which carers had the time to 
develop relationships with the client. Through a process of self-organization, carers and 
clients thus worked together to develop locally adapted informal rules to reflect the interests 
of those concerned (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Burawoy, 1979), which had legitimacy 
within client–carer relationships that outweighed those of externally imposed regulations.
Rule breaking and informal rules
While the discussion so far has highlighted the dimensions of hierarchy and contentiousness 
in rule-breaking behaviours (Martin et al., 2013), the emergence of informal rules has a key 
role to play in this study. Extending Martin et al.’s conceptualization, rule breaking is seen 
here as a phenomenon which occurs as a result of the tension between competing formal and 
informal rules, at multiple levels throughout the organizational hierarchy. As Taska (2012) 
notes, informal rules arise alongside formal rules, and ‘the pressure to break rules is never 
formal. Rather, it occurs through social norms, group pressures and institutional logics’ 
(Martin et al., 2013: 569). The breaking of formal rules occurs here when individuals adopt 
behaviours which are governed by local informal rules, as ‘such norms often demand the 
violation of formal organizational rules’ (Martin et al., 2013: 571). Conceptualizing rule 
breaking in terms of both formal and informal rules has implications for Martin et al.’s 
(2013) dimensions of hierarchy and contentiousness. First, the behaviours of individuals are 
influenced by competing rules which exist at different hierarchical levels, including both 
formal institutional/organizational rules and informal group/individual-level ones (Breslin, 
2011). For example, when choosing whether to withdraw cash for a client, care workers are 
faced with two competing sets of rules to follow. On the one hand, they could adhere to the 
relevant company rule (Org-4 in Table 1), which relates to the CQC guideline for client 
safety and wellbeing. On the other hand, they could follow an informal rule developed with 
the client concerned, who believes that the carer will not abuse their trust. The choice of 
which set of rules to follow depends on the contentiousness of each for the different parties 
concerned, and the relative power they exert on local behaviours.
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Therefore, contentiousness now refers to differing interpretations of, and power struggles 
around, these competing sets of formal and informal rules. The informal rule of withdrawing 
cash is not contested by the client as it serves his/her immediate needs. It is also not contested 
by the carer, who is acting in the client’s best interests, and fulfils personal goals for social 
justice and fairness (Bolton and Laaser, 2013). As noted above, these behaviours helped dif-
ferentiate the service offering of the organization, and so were not contested by the founder. It 
is seen that the changing balance of power also acted to ensure the dominance of local informal 
rules over time. First, by decoupling local actions from formal rules, the founder acted to 
increase the importance of the carer–client interaction relative to the external regulatory body. 
Second, positioning the organization as one which puts the client’s needs first increased the 
power of the client in the trilateral relationship between employer, worker and customer 
(Bélanger and Edwards, 2013; Lopez, 2010). Third, by recruiting care workers she believed 
would prioritize the interests of the client, the founder empowered staff to adapt to the latter’s 
needs. In summary, the shifting balance of power within the organizational hierarchy allowed 
informal rules to emerge as dominant, resulting in the breach of competing formal strictures.
More generally, where adopting an informal group-level rule also serves the interests 
of the wider organization, then breaking the formal organizational rule will not be con-
tested. Thus, different sets of rules can co-exist and be uncontested. However, when the 
enactment of both is seen to be incompatible, then conflict may occur as informal and 
formal rules compete in the guidance of behaviours. This results in a struggle for survival 
at multiple levels, as the advocates of each set of rules use their power to ensure the 
dominance of one over the other. As Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 29) note: ‘for at the 
same time they are adapting, interpreting and challenging those rules, in part because 
they are orienting their conduct to a conception of informal norms’.
Conclusion
This study not only highlights the extent to which different dimensions of rule breaking 
may both span and challenge existing hierarchies of authority and regulation both within 
and beyond the organization, but also the extent to which the boundaries of what is conten-
tious behaviour is fluid, and, at times, difficult to define (cf. Martin et al., 2013). The rule 
breaking seen in this case did not constitute irresponsible autonomy (Ackroyd and 
Thompson, 1999), but instead efforts to define autonomy on social and professional 
grounds, rather than in terms of formal organizational demarcations. At the same time, 
operators of outsourced public services are often reliant on a low wage, highly precarious 
(and, in many instances, including the firm under review, non-unionized) workforce and an 
intensification of labour time to make money (Baines, 2011: 143). Workers may engage in 
such rule-breaking activities to claw back an ethos of professionalism and a sense of worth 
in the jobs they perform; as the literature on moral economy alerts us, work and employ-
ment encompasses a dense range of ties and moral relations (Bolton and Laaser, 2013).
The role of the founder in this process should not be viewed uncritically, surviving and 
making a success of the business in a highly competitive market, but, through countenan-
cing rule breaking as a way to achieve this, running the risk of an existential crisis should 
there be a serious complaint or breach of duty of care. Driven by growth and profit, she 
increased workloads, making it more difficult for carers to deliver the required level of 
service. However, having developed the space and community which fit their notions of 
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fairness and justice, informal rules increasingly guided behaviours. The study thus adds to 
the view of rule breaking along the dimensions of hierarchy and contentiousness (Martin 
et al., 2013), by highlighting the key role played by these emerging informal norms.
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